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Abstract
Because complex organs taken from unequivocally dead people are not suitable for transplantation,
human death has been redefined so that it can be certified at some earlier stage in the dying process
and thereby make viable organs available without legal problems. Redefinitions based on concepts
of "brain death" have underpinned transplant practice for many years although those concepts have
never found universal philosophical acceptance. Neither is there consensus about the clinical tests
which have been held sufficient to diagnose the irreversible cessation of all brain function – or as
much of it as is deemed relevant – while the body remains alive.
For these reasons, the certification of death for transplant purposes on "brain death" grounds is
increasingly questioned and there has been pressure to return to its diagnosis on the basis of
cardiac arrest and the consequent cessation of blood circulation throughout the body. While
superficially a welcome return to the traditional and universally accepted understanding of human
death, examination of the protocols using such criteria for the diagnosis of death prior to organ
removal reveals a materially different scenario in which the circulatory arrest is not certainly final
and purely nominal periods of arrest are required before surgery begins.
Recognizing the probably unresolvable conflict between allowing enough time to pass after truly
final circulatory arrest for a safe diagnosis of death and its minimization for the sake of the wanted
organs, Verheijde and colleagues follow others in calling for the abandonment of the "dead donor
rule" and the enactment of legislation to permit the removal of organs from the dying, without
pretence that they are dead before that surgery. While it may be doubted whether such a
"paradigm change" in the ethics of organ procurement would be accepted by society, their call for
its consideration as a fully and fairly informed basis for organ donation is to be applauded.
Commentary
Complex organs taken from unequivocally dead people
are not suitable for transplantation. This problem was
thrust into prominence by the advent of cardiac transplan-
tation in 1967. In order to avoid the legal difficulties
which would have attended recognition of the fact that
organs were being taken from the dying, attempts were
made to redefine human death so that it could be certified
prior to commencement of the organ retrieval surgery.
Such redefinition required radical change in the conceptu-
alization of the state of death as it had been known and
understood in our society for hundreds of years.
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traced to experience with the maintenance of patients
with irremediable brain damage in the Intensive Care
Units of the 1950s and 1960s, was seized upon as a seem-
ingly ideal basis for a definition of death for transplant
purposes. In many of those patients their bodily organs
remained fully functional and so in prime condition for
transplantation when removed from patients in that state.
Organs taken in that way, from patients certified dead on
"brain death" criteria, have been the mainstay of success-
ful transplantation programmes worldwide during the
past two or three decades.
But there has never been consensus amongst philosophers
about the concept; and the clinical tests, which were sup-
posed to have the power to diagnose death of the brain
while the body remains alive and functional, clearly
lacked a sound scientific basis from the first. It is now
widely recognized that the various forms of "brain death"
are, in fact, arbitrarily defined stages in the dying process
[1,2]. Consequently, the removal of vital organs from peo-
ple while they are in those pre-mortal states offends fun-
damental ethical principles. One such principle concerns
the protection of the still living, though dying, from harm
by (surgical or other) assault. Such protection was assured
by force of law until, in some countries, legislation was
introduced to remove it for transplant purposes. Such
changes in the law – to allow the certification of death on
spurious grounds at some arbitary time in the dying proc-
ess – do not, of course, circumvent the ethical problems.
They can be addressed only by what Verheijde and col-
leagues [3] refer to as a "paradigm change" in the attitude
of "society" towards the treatment of the dying, viz. to
allow their use, with specific and completely informed
consent, as sources of organs for the benefit of others.
In order to put organ donation from the "brain dead" or
"brain stem dead" on a fair footing, a frank admission of
what is involved in procurement procedures has been
called for (among others) by Woodcock [4], by Kerridge
and colleagues [5], and by Truog and Robinson [6]. They
recognized that enabling legislation would be required if
the "dead donor rule" were to be abandoned, i.e. if it is to
be agreed and generally accepted that it is not wrong to
remove organs from people before they are dead in an
unambiguous sense which is not subject to conceptual
and semantic manipulation. And now, as so-called "brain
dead" donors are increasingly at a premium, it is encour-
aging to see the plea for open-ness and honesty about
organ procurement procedures taken up by Verheijde and
colleagues in relation to the redefinition of death on the
quasi-circulatory criteria now coming into use.
Besides being a stage-managed affair, lacking in all human
dignity, "donation after cardiac death" (DCD) raises
major ethical concerns. Surely no one could seriously sug-
gest that the dying are rendered de facto dead by a period
of cardiac arrest as short as 2 or 5 minutes? [7]. Most of
those patients could be returned to the pre-arrest state by
commonplace techniques. I have personally resuscitated
many patients after longer – sometimes much longer –
periods of cardiac arrest. Those donors are not dead on
any criteria that could be defended on scientific or other
rational grounds. Nonetheless, DCD appears on the way
to becoming "accepted practice" – perhaps because organ
transplantation has acquired a moral imperative of its
own, making it necessary and laudable to find a new way
of procuring viable organs when the previously accepted
basis is found wanting.
How long should one wait, after final circulatory arrest
and the consequent cessation of all respiration through-
out the body (and particularly the brain) before taking
organs on the premise that the donor is really and truly
dead (as envisaged by those donating under the "dead
donor rule")? I do not know. Scientific evidence directly
relevant to that question appears to be lacking at present.
The more conservative will say that there should never be
any urgency to diagnose and certify death. They may advo-
cate awaiting positive signs of death [8], saying that "we
do not assume death until there is not only no sign of life
but every conceivable sign of death" – which means, of
course, that complex organs taken thereafter will be of no
use for transplantation purposes. Hence, recognizing the
futility of attempts to redefine death, this call for consid-
eration of organ procurement from the admittedly still-
living, albeit assuredly dying, if this "paradigm change"
can be accommodated within an acceptable system of law
and ethics.
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